State Failure in a Regional Context
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Introduction

Over the past several years, the study of international security has seen a remarkable increase in engagement with two concepts—state failure and regions.1 Yet, at the same time, both literatures have remained largely unconnected: state failure is primarily analysed at the level of the (nation-) state concerned (cf. case studies in Rotberg 2003 and Schneckener 20042), while analyses of regional, and by extension, international security consider state failure only as one among many factors, albeit an increasingly important one. A third discourse, prevalent among scholars and practitioners concerned with development, uses a somewhat different terminology (fragile states, low-income countries under stress) to engage with the phenomenon of state failure and has paid more attention to its regional dimensions, but has only recently paid more careful attention to questions of security. Against this background, the aim of this paper is to begin to fuse these debates in a more systematic way and thereby to develop a useful analytical framework on the basis of which policy recommendations can be made in relation to how state failure may be prevented or contained, and how failed or collapsed states can be rebuilt.

The first three sections of this paper give a brief account of the debates on state failure and regional dimensions of international security as they have emerged over the past several years in academic and policy circles. This will necessarily be brief and does not claim to be comprehensive. In section four, I will propose the main tenets of an analytical framework that fuses these debates and shows how it may be applied, and section five will conclude by outlining the main areas in which policy advice can potentially be generated by applying this analytical framework.

This paper adopts a levels-of-analysis approach and distinguishes between individual, local, national, regional, and global levels of analysis and considers the nature and role of state and non-state actors at each of them, as well as of issues and structures that present opportunities and constraints for these actors (see Figure 1). This obviously requires a definition, in particular, of what ‘regional’ means in the context of state failure, and such a definition is presented in section 4 of the paper.


2 In fairness to the editors of these volumes and some of their contributors, I should note that regional dimensions of state failure are accounted for, such as the spread and diffusion of conflict across international boundaries, but this is not examined in a systematic fashion.
1. The State Failure Debate in Political Science and International Relations/International Security

The state failure debate has initially mainly been driven by policy concerns. Weak, failing, failed and collapsed states—the most common adjectives used in this context—were considered, quite correctly, as sources of insecurity and instability beyond their own boundaries, creating more or less complex humanitarian emergencies. Every now and then, this debate has occasionally been pierced by a policy focus on rogue states, leaving sufficient overlap to classify, rightly or wrongly, some states as both failing and rogue, such as Iraq and North Korea.

Incidents of state failure in the first half of the 1990s were predominantly analysed through the prism of the security dilemma as applied to the domestic arena. In the writings of scholars like Posen (1993), Snyder and Jervis (1999), and Walter (1999), emerging anarchy in disintegrating multinational states in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the newly independent states that emerged from them and most other countries of the region suddenly freed from the controls imposed on them by Soviet dominance of the communist bloc was seen as the main cause behind a range of ethnic conflicts. Regardless of the merits of the explanatory value of the security dilemma to such events, it soon became clear that the causal chain anarchy → security dilemma → ethnic conflict was at best an oversimplification of more complex processes, at worst it

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3 ‘Group’ in this context refers to the general sociological meaning of the term, rather than more narrowly to ethnically or religiously defined groups and may therefore also include political groups, criminal gangs, business associations, etc.
had turned the sequence and nature of events upside down. Other authors (e.g., Lake and Rothchild 1996, de Figueroa and Weingast 1999) recognised that state failure and ethnic violence are more often simultaneous rather than sequential phenomena. Today, some of the debate has moved back to an inverted square one, with some scholars arguing that state failure is accompanied by and caused by ethnic and other forms of civil conflict, albeit not by them alone (Rotberg 2003).

Thus while there was a policy and academic debate about state failure long before the issue was catapulted to the centre stage of these debates following the terrorist attacks of September 11, the issue as a whole was primarily not seen in terms of posing a risk to international security, but merely as an ‘unfortunate’ regional phenomenon of either temporary significance (Central and Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union) or of a more endemic yet not particularly threatening nature (especially Africa). This is not to say that some scholars did not recognise the implicit long-term dangers to international security posed by state failure (Manwaring 1993, Zartman 1995, Dorff 1996), but they remained at the margins of the debate.4

A dramatic change in the state failure debate occurred only after September 11. State failure was now seen as a major enabler of international terrorist networks and therefore became a key focus of both scholarly analysis (Milliken 2003, Rotberg 2003, 2004) and policy development (US National Security Doctrine, EU Security Doctrine, Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit 2005, High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2004). No longer were state failure and its consequences simply viewed through the prism of humanitarian emergencies and occasionally of threats to regional security and stability, but state failure had become an issue of utmost importance for international security. Hastily crafted responses offered little policy innovation. While there was some more pronounced verbal commitment to address not only the symptoms but also the root causes of state failure (which have so far not been unambiguously identified), the securitisation of state failure at the international level resulted in policies that by and large fell into three categories:

- **Stability trumps democracy.** Incumbent regimes, often regardless of their legitimacy, democratic credentials or human rights record, are strengthened vis-à-vis challenges they face as a consequence of domestic unrest or regional instability (e.g., Indonesia, Philippines, the Central Asian successor states of former Soviet Union, and the north African ‘buffer’ states of Chad, Niger, Mali, Mauritania).
- **Partial or temporary disengagement from third-party mediation efforts in conflicts deemed not ready for settlement.** This ‘incentivized’ conflict parties to rely on their own (military) capabilities that had already proven insufficient to settle ongoing conflicts (e.g., the Great Lakes region in Africa, the Middle East prior to 2005, and Sri Lanka).
- **Direct re-engagement or support of third-party efforts where a conflict settlement opportunity arises.** While initially far and few between, examples in this category (Kashmir, Cyprus, Middle East since 2005) imply the constructive focus on conflict settlement in an effort to alleviate strains on existing states and helping rebuild failed or collapsed states (e.g., Afghanistan).

If one looks more closely at the conceptual elements in the body of political science/international relations literature on state failure, a first issue that emerges is the relative consensus among academics that state failure is a gradual

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4 On the genesis of the state failure debate, see also Dorff 2005.
process and that states engulfed in it fall into four broad categories: weak, failing, failed and collapsed states. For all these different stages in the process of state failure, more or less elaborate indicators are developed. Rotberg (2004: 5), describes failed states as ‘tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous and contested bitterly by warring factions’ and in most of which ‘government troops battle armed revolts led by one or more rivals’ whose roots lie in ‘ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other intercommunal enmity’. A collapsed state, in Rotberg’s view, ‘is a rare and extreme version of a failed state’ which ‘exhibit a vacuum of authority’ (Rotberg 2004: 9). State failure thus being a process comprising a continuum of various stages of weakness (weak, failing failed, collapsed states) is judged on the basis of performance criteria of the state, i.e., its ability to provide public goods across its territory and to its population. This is above all related to security and the rule of law, but also extends to health care, education, transport and communication infrastructure, a regulated financial and economic system, etc. (Rotberg 2004: 3). Distinguishing between territorial control and service provision, Jenne (2003) additionally introduces the notion of a fragmented state in which state failure is limited to certain contested stretches of territory which the central government does not control (i.e., where it cannot enforce its monopoly on violence) and to which it does not extend its provision of public goods, or does so in a limited fashion only.

This refinement, in my view, is a considerable advancement in comparison of earlier studies. One of these, the so-called State Failure Task Force, was created in 1995 and sponsored by the CIA. Here state failure is considered “a type of serious political crisis exemplified by events that occurred in the 1990s in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liberia, and Afghanistan” (State Failure Task Force 2000: 4) Rejecting a narrow definition of state failure as “instances in which central state authority collapses for several years […] of which [f]ewer than 20 … episodes occurred globally between 1955 and 1998” (ibid.), a broader definition was adopted “to include a wider range of civil conflicts, political crises, and massive human-rights violations that are typically associated with state breakdown” (ibid.). This led the members of the taskforce to define state failure as one of four categories of events: revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, and genocides and politicides. On this basis, the Task Force

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5 Buzan and Wæver (2003: 22) implicitly merge the two categories of failure and collapse, noting that ‘state failure…is the collapse of empirical sovereignty.’ Reno (2000: 45) notes the category of the shadow state, describing it as ‘the product of personal rule, usually constructed behind the façade of de jure sovereignty.’
6 Defined as “[e]pisodes of sustained violent conflict between governments and politically organized challengers that seek to overthrow the central government, replace its leaders, or seize power in one region. Most revolutionary wars are fought by guerrilla armies organized by clandestine political movements.” Examples cited include Colombia since 1984, Algeria since 1991, and Tajikistan from 1992 to 1998 (State Failure Task Force 2000: 4).
7 Defined as “[e]pisodes of sustained violent conflict in which national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities challenge governments to seek major changes in status.” Examples cited include Muslims in the Philippines since 1972 (Mindanao), Tamils in Sri Lanka since 1983, and Chechens in Russia since 1994 (State Failure Task Force 2000: 4).
8 Defined as “[m]ajor, abrupt shifts in patterns of governance, including state collapse, periods of severe elite or regime instability, and shifts away from democratic toward authoritarian rule.” The authors of the report also note in this context that “some adverse regime changes are preceded by revolutionary or ethnic wars, as in Cuba in 1959 or Liberia in 1990. Some precipitate large-scale violence that may be followed by massive human rights violations. Adverse regime changes are analytically distinct from internal wars, however, and sometimes occur with minimal open violence. Peaceful changes from authoritarian rule to democratic governance are not considered state failures and thus are not included in this category.” (State Failure Task Force 2000: 4)
9 Defined as “[s]ustained policies by states or their agents, or, in civil wars, by either of the contending authorities that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal or political group. In genocides, the victimized groups are defined primarily by their communal (that is, ethnolinguistic or religious) characteristics.” Examples cited include Rwanda in 1994 and Sudan
authors identified 135 consolidated cases of state failure between 1955 and 1998. Among these, adverse regime transitions were the most frequent type of state failure, followed by ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, and ethnocides or politicides. The model developed by the members of the task force centres on three variables found crucial in predicting state failure: openness to international trade (a measure of international political and economic integration), infant mortality (indicative of living standards), and democracy.

Using three criteria to measure state performance (security, welfare and legitimacy), Schneckener (2004) distinguishes consolidated/consolidating states from weak, failing and failed/collapsed ones, using security as the key indicator. He then elaborates on three sets of factors facilitating state failure: structural factors/root causes, aggravating/accelerating factors and triggers. These can be found at three levels: international/regional (i.e., external to the state concerned), state and sub-state. Central for the analysis of state failure, according to Schneckener (2004: 20), are aggravating factors at the state level, hypothesising that elite behaviour is a key factor in the erosion or consolidation of state capacity.

Milliken and Krause (2003) distinguish between state failure as a functional dimension of stateness and state collapse as its institutional dimension. Full-blown state collapse, in their view, involves ‘the extreme disintegration of public authority and the metamorphosis of societies into a battlefield of all against all’ (Milliken and Krause 2003: 2). State failure is defined, similar to Schneckener (2004), as failure ‘to provide security and public order, legitimate representation, and wealth or welfare’.

These and other accounts of the phenomenon also usually include categorisations of states according to their ‘location’ on the state failure continuum. These are snapshots of a particular moment in time and as such often static descriptions of a dynamic process of development that states undergo between weakness and collapse, and back (see Table 1).

2. The Development Discourse on Fragile States

Scholars and practitioners of development have been confronted with issues related to state weakness, failure and collapse for a long period of time and have engaged them primarily through the lense of development, or more precisely a lack thereof. This is reflected primarily in the terminology used and the definitional concepts adopted. Increasingly, however, policy prescriptions of development scholars and practitioners resemble those made in the context of political science and international relations approaches to state failure and regional/international security more closely.

The development discourse, as exemplified in papers by overseas development agencies, the World Bank, the OECD, etc., seems to have converged on the term ‘fragile states’ to describe a range of phenomena associated with state weakness and failure, including state collapse, loss of territorial control, low administrative

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capacity, political instability, neo-patrimonial politics, conflict, and repressive politics (Moreno Torres and Anderson 2004).  

According to a working definition adopted by the UK’s Department for International Development (2005: 7f., my emphasis), fragile states are ‘those where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor. The most important functions of the state for poverty reduction are territorial control, safety and security, capacity to manage public resources, delivery of basic services, and the ability to protect and support the ways in which the poorest people sustain themselves.’ The definition also explicitly notes that it is not limited to states affected by conflict. Importantly from a policy perspective, features of fragile states are attributed both regarding to capacity and willingness of the state to overcome fragility. Applied to developing countries, DfID finds four categories of countries: ‘good performers’ with capacity and will, ‘weak but willing states’ (i.e., those where all capacity is missing), ‘strong but unresponsive states’ (i.e., those where political will is lacking within a usually repressive regime), and ‘weak-weak states’ in which there is neither capacity nor will to overcome fragility. Using World Bank Country Policies and Institutional Performance Assessment (CPIA) ratings, DfID (2005: 27f.) generated a proxy list of 46 fragile states which appeared at least once in the fourth and fifth quintiles between 1999 and 2003 (see Table 2).  

CPIA ratings also form the basis of the World Bank’s list of low-income countries under stress. These are defined as ‘fragile states characterized by a debilitating combination of weak governance, policies and institutions’. According to the World Bank there are around thirty such countries, three-quarters of them affected by on-going armed conflicts (World Bank 2005), but there is no precise list of these countries, apart from 12 that have so far been selected for World Bank projects.  

The crucial trend in most of these definitions seems to be that, more than ever before, scholars and practitioners of development have established a clear link between development and security, the latter primarily in the sense of elementary physical security for people and property. Thus, Picciotta et al. (2005: 19), for example, define a fragile state as one that ‘cannot manage the combined demands of security and development,’ and conclude that ‘a judicious balance should be struck among the global, regional and local dimensions of the new security and development challenge’ (ibid.: 29).  

This recognition of the importance of a multi-level approach to the problem of state fragility is reflected widely in more recent publications, as several authors who are part of the development discourse on fragile states examined above consider dimensions and implications of state fragility beyond the boundaries of  

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12 This paper also contains a very useful and referenced overview of various existing definitions in Annex 2, pp. 28-33. Definitions are clustered according to three main approaches that the development community seems to take towards the phenomenon: ‘fragile, failed, or crisis states’ with a focus on state capacity related to sovereignty and conflict; ‘poor performing countries’ concerned with development outcomes and factors such as the quality of governance and policy choices; and ‘difficult aid partners’ addressing issues of donor-recipient relations in situations in which there is either a lack of will or capacity on the part of the recipient (Moreno Torres and Anderson 2004: 28).  

13 Assessments of state willingness include both a judgement of how explicitly states commit politically to poverty reduction (including the existence of a ‘clear strategy and the means and incentives to implement it’) and of how inclusive this commitment is implemented, i.e., the degree to which all sections of the population benefit from it (Moreno Torres and Anderson 2004: 17).  

Moreno Torres and Anderson (2005: 9), for example, state that in relation to West Africa ‘[n]o attempt to understand or address state weakness in the region can ignore the cross-border dimensions. Since the geographical scope of state weakness is not always coterminous with national borders, it makes sense to consider the regional or supra-state aspects of the conflict’ (emphasis in original) and add that this also applies to the South Caucasus, the Horn of Africa and the African Great Lakes region. The global impact of fragile states is thus obvious in a number of different aspects: interstate wars, refugee flows across borders, conventional weapons proliferation, exacerbation of regional conflicts, global security threats in relation to international terrorism (safe havens, limited capacity to cooperate in international law enforcement efforts), trade in WMD materials, international organised crime, energy security, and a weakening of international control and regulation systems (environmental protection, spread of diseases) (Moreno Torres and Anderson 2005: 8). Similarly, Picciotto et al. (2005: 12) refer to so-called ‘problems without passports’: conflict spillovers, transnational organised crime, trafficking in guns, drugs and humans, infectious diseases and environmental threats.

Concerns about implications of state fragility beyond the actually fragile state are echoed elsewhere in the development literature as well. Another DfID (2005: 10) report notes that ‘[t]he impact of instability can spread well beyond national borders…[t]his can be seen in refugee flows, the spread of HIV/AIDS, arms smuggling and the breakdown of trade.’ This report also makes reference to research conducted at the World Bank by Lisa Chauvet and Paul Collier (2004) which investigated the question whether low-income countries under stress (LICUS) generate so-called spill-over costs for their neighbours. Chauvet and Collier’s findings clearly underline the regional dimension of state weakness: ‘the typical neighbour loses 1.6 percentage points of their growth rate if their neighbour is a LICUS’ (Chauvet and Collier 2004: 4). These results are based on measurements of economic factors and did not take account of non-economic spill-over consequences often associated with armed conflict, such as the spread of the actual conflict, refugee flows, organised crime, etc. (ibid.). Reflecting the importance of regional dimensions for policy planning vis-à-vis fragile states, Lockhart (2005: 8) emphasises that ‘where cross-border issues are critical…analysis and engagement need to be sufficiently flexible to move to the…regional level.’ In a study of the strategic frameworks for peace-building in the four so-called Ulstein countries (Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK16), Smith (2004: 57) points out that ‘[e]xperiences in, for example, the western Balkans, West Africa, and the Great Lakes region show that the regional context of conflict is often fundamental to the prospects for peacebuilding’, but also noted that there was a general strategic deficit in project implementation in this respect.

The most explicit recognition of the regional dimensions of state fragility in the development discourse comes, unsurprisingly, in a case study of peace-building and development in the Democratic Republic of Congo (OECD 2004). Regional aspects in this report are considered of crucial importance as contributing factors to the difficult situation in the country (arms trafficking across borders, direct and

15 While the development literature generally is more attentive to such regional dimensions, there remains a significant subset of the literature that does not pay much attention to the regional context of state fragility. For example, a paper on good governance in post-conflict societies by the German development agency GTZ, commissioned by the federal development ministry, considers the diaspora as the only relevant external player (GTZ 2004: 7). Hopp and Kloke-Lesch (2005) in their paper on external nation-building and endogenous nation formation and Kloke-Lesch (2004) in his address to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on German development policy do not consider regional aspects at all.

16 The four original member states of the group were later joined by Sweden and Canada.
indirect military involvement of neighbouring states) and translate into concrete policy recommendations meant to address the problems encountered in the peace process and from a wider development perspective (enhanced regional cooperation and cooperation and regional policy coherence among donors).17

While the development discourse is thus increasingly characterised by a number of shared assumptions about the importance of linking security, development and a broader regional vision in accounts of state fragility, and policy recommendations on how to deal with it, one of its significant shortcomings is a lack of a commonly agreed and universally applied definition of what constitutes a fragile state.18 As a consequence, there is no joint list of fragile states among even major donor agencies. In fact, as Picciotto et al. (2005: Annex 3) point out, there is significant divergence among them about methodologies used, data to be included, and approaches adopted leading to several different categorisations of states as fragile or not. Existing overlap coexists with disagreement, leading to policy incoherence toward specific states.

3. The Discourse on Regions and Security
Traditionally, regions have not figured prominently in international security studies, and if they did, rather unwieldy regions of the dimensions of continents or the Euro-Atlantic area were defined.19 This has changed over the past decade-and-a-half or so, and regions have become a more prominent analytical category. Apart from studies in the field of international political economy, scholars have focussed on regions in different ways, including conceptual clarifications of the concept (e.g., Väyrynen 2003), theories of regional security (Adler and Barnett 1998, Buzan and Waever 2003, Lemke 2002), regional collective security arrangements (Ayoob 1999, Fawcett 2003, Lake and Morgan 1997, Roper 1998, Sperling and Kirchner 1997), and regional peacekeeping and conflict management (Diehl and Lepgold 2003, Duke 2003, MacFarlane 2001). Partly overlapping with these three areas of security studies in which regions have made a comeback are studies that, rather than primarily focussing on state actors and international organisations, extend their analyses to non-state actors, including ethnic groups, trade networks and transnational organised criminal organisations (Adamson 2005, Mincheva 2002, Pugh and Cooper 2004, Rubin 2001). This literature offers a useful starting point for an examination of the regional context of state failure. For reasons of space constraints, I shall focus on five, in my view, particularly relevant contributions—Lemke’s Regions of War and Peace (2002), Buzan and Waever’s Regions and Powers (2003), Rubin’s ‘Regional Approaches to Conflict Management in Africa’ (2001), Mincheva’s ‘Dissolving Boundaries between Domestic and Regional/International Conflict’ (2002), and Adamson’s ‘Globalisation, Transnational Political Mobilisation and Networks of Violence’ (2005).

17 The widespread acknowledgement of the importance of regional aspects of state fragility within the development discourse has also led to an incorporation of regional factors into the set of analytical tools used by development agencies in their assessment of conflict and post-conflict situations. Thus, the regional level is included in any mapping exercise of structural and proximate conflict factors (Joint UNDG-ECHA Working Group on Transition 2004: 5). A similar document produced by UNDP, World Bank and the UN Development Group, however, is much less specific in its incorporation of regional dimensions, emphasising the need to tailor post-conflict recovery programmes ‘to the specific local and national context’ (UNDP et al. 2004: 4) and makes only one vague reference to regional aspects among important background factors to a conflict (ibid.: 22), the term ‘regional’ here, however, more likely to refer to sub-national localities. This is partially also true for Picciotto (2005: e.g., 9).

18 As noted in Section 2, this is also a problem in the political science/international relations discourse.

19 For a detailed assessment of this shortcoming see Lemke (2002: 67ff.).

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Lemke modifies and extends power transition theory to the interactions of minor powers in what he calls local hierarchies. He thus constructs a ‘multiple hierarchy model’ in which the dynamics of war and peace at each level of the model (overall international system and local hierarchies) are broadly similar in the absence of great power intervention (Lemke 2002: 52f. and Chapter 3 more generally). Membership in local hierarchies, in Lemke’s system, is defined by state’s abilities to reach each other militarily (i.e., to be potentially able to conquer each other’s capital), which in turn is quantified by a revised version of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita’s loss-of-strength-gradient formula (Lemke 2002: 68-81). This allows him to construct local hierarchies within the more traditional IR regions—four in South America, three in the Middle East, four in the Far East (along with three additional dyadic local hierarchies), and nine in Africa.20

Buzan and Wæver (2003) built on earlier work of their own and other scholars to develop a theory of international security in which so-called regional security complexes are the main building bloc. Drawing on neo-classical realism and globalism, Buzan and Wæver (2003: 27-39) develop a three-tiered scheme of the international security structure in the post-Cold War world with one superpower (USA) and four great powers (EU, Japan, China and Russia) acting at the system level and regional powers at the regional level. A regional security complex is ‘defined by durable patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of sub-global, geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 45). Geographic proximity is said to matter more in terms of military, political, societal and environmental dimensions of security, less so in relation to economic ones (ibid.: 45-6). The four main elements of any regional security complex are its boundaries, its anarchic structure (requiring a minimum of two autonomous units within it), polarity (uni-, bi-, and multi-polar power distributions), and its socially constructed patterns of amity and enmity (ibid.: 53). Similar to Lemke (2002: Chapter 6), Buzan and Wæver emphasise that outside power penetration of a regional security complex is a factor that has an impact on the already existing ‘pattern of rivalry, balance-of-power, and alliance[s] … among the main powers within a region’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 47, emphasis in original). Regional security complexes are not considered static, but evolving in either one of three ways—maintenance of the status quo, internal transformation (changes to anarchic structure, polarity and socially constructed patterns of amity and enmity within existing boundaries), or external transformation (splitting up of a regional security complex or merger of two pre-existing ones) (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 53).

Buzan and Wæver, in contrast to Lemke, consider at least to some extent non-state actors in their analysis as well, and crucially so in the context of state weakness, noting that ‘[w]hen the states are weak and nonstate actors take on a relatively larger role, the question of the power of the units … should logically be asked of all units, state and nonstate. If some of the ‘other’ units were strong and formed stable constellations of threat and vulnerability—e.g., transnational tribal groups—this would very well qualify’ as a regional security complex (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 64).

Even so, like Lemke’s approach to the study of regional dimensions of international security, Buzan and Wæver’s analysis, too, does not, in my view, capture fully the increasing significance of non-state actors and their interplay with, and manipulation of and by state actors internal and external to a given 20 These are listed in tabular form in Lemke (2002: 90-1). Because of the use of potential military interaction as definitional criterion, states can simultaneously be members of several local hierarchies. This in contrast to Buzan and Wæver (2003: 49) who argue that regional security complexes are mutually exclusive and not overlapping.
region. This has its reason primarily in the state-centric approach taken by this literature. As the main units of analysis remain states, the structure of regions, and their very definition is defined in terms of state capacity. In Lemke’s approach this is manifest in his definition of local hierarchies as determined by states’ capacity to threaten each other militarily and in Buzan and Wæver’s definition of regional security complexes as a function of the units’ power to generate security interdependence on a regional level.\textsuperscript{21}

The security relevance of non-state actors is, however, captured in the work of other scholars. Barnett Rubin introduced the term ‘regional conflict formation’ into the debate in 2001, defining the phenomenon as ‘sets of transnational conflicts that form mutually reinforcing linkages with each other throughout a region, making for more protracted and obdurate conflicts’ and emphasising that they included ‘regional military, political, economic, and social networks, which are in turn linked to global networks.’\textsuperscript{22}

Mincheva (2002), drawing on earlier work by, among others, Horowitz (1991), focuses on one particular type of transborder actor, so-called ethnoterritorial separatist movements, described as ‘a transborder movement, composed of territorially contiguous but politically bi-sected ethnic communities’ pursuing ‘claims that transcend state borders’ and thereby diffusing ‘communal action across borders’ and potentially causing ‘domestic communal conflicts to spill over into] the (regional) international system.’ Such movements are further characterized as ‘the political organization of regionally concentrated groups who wish to demonstrate cultural cohesiveness and political solidarity by contesting the ethnic legitimacy of existing state boundaries’ (Mincheva 2002). As irredentism and secessionism are both possible objectives of ethnoterritorial separatist movements, they potentially affect more than one state in the region, thus possibly instigating ‘a series of inter-state conflicts and border disputes’.

Adamson (2005) presents a persuasive argument about the increasing, globalisation-induced and –inducing mobility of people, goods, capital, ideas and information have combined to ‘produce transnational resource bases and constituencies that can be tapped into by non-state political entrepreneurs in the process of political mobilisation’ (Adamson 2005: 33). The consequences of the political challenges posed by the cross-border networks thus created are particularly damaging in weakly institutionalised states which in turn become the sources of broader regional and global security threats (ibid.: 43). According to Adamson (2005: 44), ‘[b]ecause weakly institutionalised settings provide institutional incentives both for transnational political mobilisation and for the use of violence as a political tool by non-state actors, the weakness of states (including the lack of participatory institutions) comes to be seen as not simply a domestic problem for those states, but as a security threat.’

4. The Regional Dimensions of State Failure/Fragility
What are the potential gains of ‘regionalising’ the state failure debate? The first is closely related to a lack of consensus over what constitutes a weak, fragile, failing or failed state: there is usually consensus among academics and practitioners about clear-cut cases of state failure, and combining this consensus with a

\textsuperscript{21} Note, as mentioned above, that Buzan and Wæver consider that non-state actors may be ‘units’ of analysis as well. However, their delineation of the post-Cold War patterns of regional security in Africa admits that its specific representation ‘overrepresents state territoriality and underrepresents nonstate actors’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 231).

\textsuperscript{22} The first part of this definition can be found at the project page of NYU’s Center on International Cooperation (http://www.cic.nyu.edu/conflict/conflict_project6.html), the second part appears in Rubin (2001).
regional approach might make debates over states that are on some lists but not others superfluous, as they would be included, in all likelihood by means of a regional approach to state failure. Second, ‘regionalising’ state failure might lead to a more precise definition of what ‘region’ means in the context of state failure, i.e., what the spatial and functional dimensions and extent of relevant regions are. Third, and closely related to the first two anticipated gains, understanding spatial and functional dimensions of regions in the state failure context can generate a better understanding of regional structures, actors and dynamics and of their impact on processes of state failure. With regional dimensions more clearly defined and structures, actors and dynamics more clearly determined, i.e., with a more thorough distinction of the regional from the national and global levels, ‘regionalising’ the state failure debate would also imply arriving at a more comprehensive understanding of the interplay between the different levels of analysis (individual, local, national, regional, global) and the factors that can be attributed to them in causing, managing and preventing state failure. Defining relevant regions can then in future research be used for more systematic cross-regional comparisons in an effort to investigate similarities and dissimilarities across regional patterns of state failure. This finally will contribute to an enhanced capability of predicting consequences of specific actions under particular circumstances, and hence more useful policy recommendations for global, regional and national state and non-state actors.

**Defining Regions in the Context of State Failure**

A definition of ‘region’ in the state failure context makes sense for a variety of anticipated gains in knowledge and understanding, as outlined above. It is also practically feasible from the perspective that a comparison of different existing lists of weak, fragile, failing, failed, etc. states reveals certain regional clusters in which state failure seems more prevalent (see Tables 1-4), regardless of the fact that different approaches to the phenomenon yield very different classifications of countries.

Tables 1-3 below give a snapshot of the different approaches to state failure and the different results and classifications they yield. The tables are not meant to be an accurate description of the current status of any given country listed within them. Rather, Table 1 merges several previous attempts to illustrate state failure in the political science/international relations literature. These date to specific moments of time and are based on different definitions and typologies of state failure, several states are, therefore, mentioned multiple times. Table 1 is also the one that incorporates most specifically political data into the classification, whereas Tables 2 and 3 generally proceed from development indicators and then apply different social, economic, and political criteria. Table 2 reproduces a geographically ‘ordered’ so-called ‘proxy list of fragile states’ used by DfID (2005: 27f.) which is based on World Bank CPIA ratings. Table 3 draws on a the application of a methodology developed by Picciotto et al. (2005) which combines capacity (to deliver public goods proxied by immunisation and literacy rates) and resilience (ratings of voice and accountability and political freedom) as key indicators of state fragility. Table 4 is based on research conducted by the Fund for

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23 Picciotto et al. (2005: 58) have compared a range of different country classifications among development agencies, noting that among countries ranked in the first two quintiles of the CPIA ratings, six have a security gap, three have a legitimacy gap; eight have a capacity gap; among countries ranked in the first three quintiles of the CPIA ratings, ten do not meet US government Millennium Challenge Account criteria; seven of thirty-four LICUS countries are not on UNDP’s list of countries with special development needs; while twelve countries listed there are not on the LICUS list.
Peace in cooperation with Foreign Policy. Based on a range of twelve social, economic, political and military indicators, states were ranked in terms of their likelihood of failure.\(^{24}\)

**Table 1: A Political Science/International Relations View on State Failure\(^{25}\)**

**Collapsed States**
- **Africa:** DRC, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia
- **Asia+Pacific:** Lebanon, Tajikistan
- **Europe:** Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina

**Failed States**
- **Africa:** Angola, Burundi, DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan
- **Asia+Pacific:** Afghanistan, Iraq, Nauru, Solomon Islands
- **Europe:** Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina

**Failing States**
- **Africa:** Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe
- **Asia+Pacific:** Indonesia, Iraq, North Korea
- **Americas:** Colombia, Venezuela
- **Europe:** Albania, Moldova

**Weak States**
- **Africa:** Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria
- **Asia+Pacific:** Burma, Cambodia, Fiji, Georgia, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, North Korea, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Yemen
- **Americas:** Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Paraguay, Venezuela
- **Europe:** Belarus, Moldova

**Fragmented States**
- **Africa:** Ethiopia, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan
- **Asia+Pacific:** Azerbaijan, Georgia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka
- **Americas:** Colombia
- **Europe:** Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo)

**Table 2: Capacity and Willingness as Indicators of State Fragility\(^{26}\)**

**Africa:** Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, São Tomé & Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Zimbabwe

**Asia+Pacific:** Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Burma, Cambodia, Georgia, Indonesia, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tajikistan, Timor Leste, Togo, Tonga, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Republic of Yemen

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\(^{25}\) Compiled from various sources, including Debiel (2002), Rotberg (2003 and 2004), Schneckener (2004), and State Failure Task Force (2003). Does not imply simultaneity or currency of state failure. For a comparative assessment of similar lists, see below and Picciotto et al. (2005: Annex 3).

\(^{26}\) This table is based on DfID (2005: 27f.). Countries have been arranged according to geographic location.
Americas: Dominica, Haiti, Guyana

Table 3: Capacity and Resilience as Indicators of State Fragility

Fragile States (Low Capacity/High Resilience)
Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Mali, Senegal, São Tomé & Príncipe
Asia+Pacific: Papua New Guinea

Fragile States (High Capacity/Low Resilience)
Africa: Eritrea, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Asia+Pacific: Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam,

Very Fragile States (Low Capacity/Low Resilience)
Africa: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Togo
Asia+Pacific: Bangladesh, Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Nepal, Pakistan, Yemen
Americas: Haiti

Table 4: The Thirty States Most Vulnerable to Failure according to the Fund for Peace Failed States Index

Africa: Cote d’Ivoire (1); Dem. Rep. of the Congo (2); Sudan (3); Somalia (5); Sierra Leone (1); Chad (7); Liberia (9); Rwanda (12); Zimbabwe (15); Guinea (16); Burundi (18); Central African Republic (20); Kenya (25); Uganda (27); Ethiopia (30)
Asia+Pacific: Iraq (4); Yemen (8); Afghanistan (11); North Korea (13); Bangladesh (17); Burma/Myanmar (23); Uzbekistan (24); Bhutan (26); Laos (28); Syria (29)
Americas: Haiti (10); Colombia (14); Dominican Republic (19); Venezuela (21);
Europe: Bosnia and Herzegovina (22);

Leaving aside the significant differences that the three tables indicate, a geographic mapping exercise of these countries indicates that state failure is a widespread phenomenon, but that it occurs with certain regional concentrations where different gradations of state failure are clustered. Unsurprisingly, sub-Saharan Africa has a high concentration of state failure incidents with a large number of weak and failing states, several failed ones and the classic example of state collapse—Somalia.

On a smaller scale, Central Asia is another state failure cluster—Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan—as are the South Caucasus (with Georgia and Azerbaijan) and the Western Balkans (with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro). In the rest of Asia and the Pacific, a geographically relatively contiguous cluster exists with Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. It is important to note that even within such

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27 This table is based on Picciotto et al. (2005: 50ff.). Countries have been arranged according to geographic location.
regional clusters state failure does not necessarily occur simultaneously in all states concerned. For example, Bosnia and Herzegovina experiences state failure during its civil war in the first half of the 1990s, Albania in 1997 following the collapse of a pyramid investment scheme, Serbia and Montenegro has seen continuous weakness for more than a decade and been fragmented for half of that in relation to Kosovo, while Macedonia was a weak state for most of the 1990s and at the brink of failure in 2001 during an armed rebellion of parts of its ethnic Albanian minority.

Likewise, one needs to note that there are also a number of geographically more isolated instances of state failure: Sri Lanka, Philippines, Nauru in Asia and the Pacific, Haiti and Colombia in the Americas, Moldova and Belarus in Europe. As these are more peripheral to this paper, I shall concentrate in the following on cases in which state failure occurs in a geographically contiguous space and examine its dynamics in more detail. Initially, however, a more detailed exploration of the concept of ‘region’ in international security studies is required.

The existing literatures on regional dimensions of international security and on state failure reviewed above offer a good starting point for arriving at definition of the regional in the state failure context. Military capability (Lemke), durable patterns of amity and enmity between state and non-state actors (Buzan and Wæver), sets of transnational conflicts forming mutually reinforcing linkages and including military, political, economic, and social networks at the regional level with links to the global level (Rubin), and transborder movements of politically organized, regionally concentrated groups contesting the legitimacy of existing boundaries are all necessary elements in a definition of the regional dimension of state failure.

State failure defined as the process of the gradual loss of de facto sovereignty implies an inability of state institutions to enforce a monopoly on the legitimate use of force vis-à-vis an existing population and across the entire territory within the internationally recognised boundaries of a state. This definition focuses narrowly on the security function of the state and its in/ability to perform it across its entire territory. I consider this the baseline of state performance and thus as the ultimate indicator of stateness. Further factors, such as legitimacy and welfare functions, noted, among others, by Schneckener (2004), are difficult to ignore in a broader discussion of the state, but they do not directly indicate whether a state has any degree of empirical sovereignty or not. Moreover, states not perceived legitimate by (significant segments of) their populations or unable or unwilling to provide public services, such as healthcare, education, etc., will sooner or later experience challenges to their ability to enforce a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Legitimacy and welfare functions of states are thus better seen as indirect causes of eventual state failure, rather than as indications of state failure itself. By the same token, state failure, as defined here, also causes a loss of legitimacy and an inability to perform welfare functions. Different aspects of state failure, thus, can become mutually reinforcing factors at some stage in the state failure process, contributing further to a downward spiral toward potential state collapse.

From this perspective, ‘regionalising’ state failure requires an assessment of which factors cause states to lose control over their territory and investigate the extent to which these factors are external to a given state but located in its neighbourhood. This requires considering the key element of Lemke’s definition of

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29 Thus North Korea and pre-war Iraq would not qualify as failed states, Afghanistan under the Taliban would count as a fragmented state (cf. Jenne 2003).
local hierarchies—states other than the great powers that pose a military threat to a given state—and combine it with Rubin’s and Mincheva’s emphasis on non-state actors operating at the regional level, i.e., military, political, economic, social, and as a subcategory of the latter, ethnic networks. Two additional elements, rarely mentioned in the literature outside the development discourse, are environmental factors and ‘economic proximity costs’, i.e., what Collier refers to as spillover costs. In addition, and not unrelated to the last two sets of factors mentioned, are certain geographical conditions, such as states being landlocked and dependent on neighbours for trade access to the open sea, riparian states dependent on the same water supply source as their neighbours, and dependency on oil pipelines for energy supplies or revenues from transit rights.

The extent of a state failure region marks the reach of these networks and factors, and includes other states posing a potential military threat. A region in the context of state failure is thus likely to be larger than the local hierarchies defined by Lemke (based on military capability) and smaller than the regional security complexes defined by Buzan and Wæver (based on durable patterns of amity and enmity between state and non-state actors).  

Delineating the regional context of state failure in terms of threats emanating from other states with appropriate military capabilities and non-state actors posing a challenge to a given state’s sovereignty (that is, its control over the territory within its internationally recognised boundaries) also implies that regions in the state failure context remain state centric, not only because states remain for the time being the predominant (if not the only) form of territorial organisation but also because state failure is only a meaningful category of analysis in the context of these units. Thus, spatially, state failure regions are entirely composed of (most likely contiguous) states, while functionally, or at the actor level, they include only specific states (those with an appropriate military capability) and additionally non-state actors who are capable of wresting territorial control from existing states. This means that, seen from the perspective of a state at risk of failure, its relevant region may include both militarily threatening states as well as states from within whose borders threatening non-state actors operate.

Such a definition, therefore, conceptually extends beyond Lemke’s local hierarchies, but is more narrow than the vast regional security complexes established by Buzan and Wæver. Both of these other conceptions of ‘region’ remain relevant, however. Lemke’s concept provides a key ingredient in the definition of state failure region, while Buzan and Wæver’s regional security complexes demarcate the outer limits of potentially contiguous and overlapping state failure regions. In the same way in which in Lemke’s definition one state could potentially be a member of different of local hierarchies simultaneously, states can also belong to different state failure regions. For example, a Horn of Africa region would include Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan, while the latter could also be a component of a neighbouring region, additionally comprising Chad and the Central African Republic.

States that ‘connect’ two different state failure regions are particularly important from a policy perspective: they can act both as buffer states (preventing the spread of state failure from one region to another) and as trigger states (enabling state failure to spread from one region to another). They must, therefore, be

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30 At an empirical level, state failure regions in my conceptualisation are quite similar, if not identical, to what Buzan and Wæver describe as the ‘Central Asian subcomplex’, ‘Balkan subcomplex’ or ‘Caucasus mini-complex’.
seen as important targets of external intervention aimed at arresting processes of regional state failure. Even where regional responses are adopted, priorities will have to be set by the international community or regional actors, and states connecting two state failure regions need to be prioritised in external efforts, precisely because the dynamics developing in them as a consequence of regional processes of state failure have the capability to destabilise a neighbouring region, potentially causing another regional process of state failure.

*Regional Structures, Actors and Dynamics and Their Impact on Processes of State Failure*

State failure is a dynamic process. Failure does not automatically follow from weakness, state failure processes can be arrested and reversed, states can recover from failure or lapse back into it. This means that state failure regions are not static either. As actor capabilities (and agendas) change, as new actors emerge and existing ones disappear, so too do the dynamics and structures in state failure regions change. A Sudan/Chad/Central African Republic region, for example, would be a relatively new one, predominantly related to the events in Darfur, including the cross-border displacement of thousands of refugees from this western area of Sudan. The dynamics of state failure regions are, thus, determined by the interactions between and within its units. State actors can threaten each other, but they can also form alliances against jointly perceived threats from other states and non-state actors. Non-state actors can be actors in their own right (e.g., transnational criminal networks), they can enjoy patronage by state actors and/or may be used by them as proxies in regional disputes and rivalries. These structural configurations, too, are likely to change over time, as preferences of actors shift, and new opportunities or constraints on their actions arise.

This latter point, in particular, draws attention to the fact that the regionalisation of state failure does not mean that regional structures and dynamics of interaction are taken to operate in isolation from either the domestic level or the global level. Domestic factors within states that belong to a state failure region are obvious factors determining these regional structures and dynamics. States’ capacity to exercise effective control over their territory, for example, is determined by a variety of domestic-level factors, such as GDP, social cohesion, nature of the political system, ethnic demography, settlement patterns, resource endowment, urbanisation, etc. At the same time, global factors have a direct impact on regional structures and dynamics, as well as an indirect one through their influence on domestic ones. Economic interaction, legal and illegal, strengthens state capacity and intensifies patterns of interaction at the regional level and beyond.

Penetration of a state failure region by great powers, international and regional organisations has similar effects on structures and dynamics of interaction between and within units at the regional level. Strategic interests of outside powers may bolster the capacity of individual states to cope with threats, at the expense of their challengers. While this may increase the chances of this particular state to escape the prospect of state failure, such external intervention potentially gives rise to a phenomenon described by Pugh and Cooper (2004) as conflict displacement. Thus an unintended consequence of averting the risk of state failure in one state, for example by enhancing this state’s law enforcement capacity in dealing with a transnational criminal network, may cause this network to relocate into a neighbouring state. This can then lead to a shift in the boundaries of the state failure region—adding another state or ‘subtracting’ one from its dimensions, including the possible merger of two contiguous or overlapping regions into one. This can be a temporary process, such as in the
three-year war in the DRC between 1998 and 2001 involving all the country's neighbours who would not normally be considered to belong to the same state failure region (e.g., Angola and Uganda otherwise have very little interaction in terms of the functional and spatial dimensions of a state failure region). It may, however, also be a longer-term, if not permanent process, such as in the case of Iraq, Syria and Iran whose interactions have significantly intensified following the war against Iraq and the collapse of public order in the country.

The structures and dynamics of state failure have also been affected by the growing importance of Islamic fundamentalism and international and regional terrorist networks. On the one hand, state weakness allows terrorist networks to get a foothold in a particular country. This may additionally be facilitated as the conditions within weak states may give rise to exactly those grievances in which recruitment of terrorists is easier. On the other hand, the shifting foreign policy agendas of the great powers, most notably the United States, also means that real or perceived links between state failure and terrorism are more likely to prompt intervention in defence of states threatened by failure.

From Analysis to Policy Recommendations

A better understanding of the regional dynamics of state failure, i.e., an understanding of how widespread the phenomenon state failure is in a given region and how actors and the structures of their interaction, contribute to the likelihood of failure in a particular state, the more effective an intervention strategy can be conceived that does more than merely displace the risk of failure and/or its causes to states within the same or an overlapping or contiguous region of state failure in the same neighbourhood.

Analysing state failure in a regional context would necessarily have to begin with identifying the boundaries of the state failure region in question and determining to what extent it overlaps with, or borders other such regions. Once regional boundaries have been determined, the relevant actors and structures of their interaction within and beyond the region need to be identified. This, in turn, can give insights into useful points and strategies of intervention, that is, when, where and how to intervene or not to intervene.
References


