ETHNOPOLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE

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Over the past two decades, the study of ethnopolitics has leaped from the margins of political science and international relations into the centre of these and other social science disciplines and has become a recognized sub-field attracting increasing numbers of students. This is not to say that, in the past, matters related to the study of ethnopolitics were completely neglected: there had always been an interest among social scientists in issues such as nations, nationalism and identity, often leading to intense debates among proponents of different schools of thought. Yet in the Europe of the 1950s and 1960s there was very little evidence that these topics had much practical political relevance. The terrible consequences of extreme ethnonationalism that had plagued various parts of the continent for most of the nineteenth century and particularly for the first half of the twentieth century seemed to have been left behind on the battlefields of the Second World War. In the non-communist part of the continent post-war Keynesian prosperity coupled with the near universal application of welfare statism promoted ideological and national cohesion. In the communist ruled parts of Europe, it appeared that a combination of genocide, ethnic cleansing and the rigorous application of 'really existing' socialism had 'solved' the national question in a vast sweep of territory from the inner-German border to the Ural mountains and beyond.

Today it is obvious that this perception was at best a pleasing illusion and at worst a demonstration of the inability of academics and policy-makers to understand the fundamental significance of ethnicity and ethnicity-based politics for society. By the end of the 1960s, Northern Ireland would see the beginning of its ‘troubles’. In 1963, the consociational settlement in Cyprus broke down and a fragile peace was maintained only in the wake of partition, ethnic cleansing, and decisive external intervention in 1974. Around the same time, the century-old Basque conflict in Spain would begin to affect the country’s transition process to democracy following the death of General Franco. Less spectacular events and processes that indicated the return of ethnicity as a political and public, rather than private and individual, matter to the democratic societies of western Europe could be observed in almost every country of the region. In France, groups such as the Bretons, Alsatians, and Corsicans began to assert their ethnolinguistic and ethnocultural identities. In Austria, an increasingly vocal, and partly violent, Slovene minority demanded the recognition of its identity and the implementation of rights and privileges that would allow it to preserve its culture for future generations. In 1969, and in the wake of a small-scale armed campaign by a handful of alienated South Tyrolese, Italy, Austria, and the German-speaking minority of South Tyrol came to an agreement that created a political entity in Northern Italy with unprecedented powers of self-government. In Switzerland, a new canton was created in order to accommodate the demands of Jurassians. In Belgium, it took several constitutional reforms to preserve the unity of the country, and it is still by no means certain that Belgium can survive as a nation-state in the long-term. Finally, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, among others, began to experience tensions with immigrant populations, which persist to this day at different levels of intensity. None of these events, however, it seemed had prepared anyone for what was to happen in central and eastern Europe after the collapse of communism. While some predictions of
By the end of the 1990s, there could be little doubt that ethnicity had regained its status as a powerful force in European politics. While other sources of identity, such as class, gender, age and ideology, to name but a few, continue to matter, hardly any of them has received such broad media exposure, public consideration, political attention, and academic treatment as ethnicity. This, however, has contributed little to a proper clarification of the sources, manifestations, and consequences of ethnopolitics. In order to understand the importance of politically mobilised ethnic groups in contemporary European politics, we must therefore begin with an examination of Europe’s path to modernity and of the roots of the significance that ethnicity has acquired, before analysing the nature of ethnopolitics.

**Ethnopolitics: Conflict or Co-operation?**

Very often, ethnopolitics is regarded as being synonymous with ethnic conflict. This should hardly come as a surprise as violent confrontation and bloodshed receive more airtime and sell more copies than does ‘uneventful’ non-violent co-operation. Yet, it would be wrong if we mistook ethnopolitics to mean nothing but ethnic conflict. While there has been an abundance of the latter in Europe in the distant and not so distant past, ethnopolitics cannot be reduced to the mere study of conflict alone. Following a historical exploration of the phenomenon, we will therefore examine both the ‘dark side’ of ethnopolitics and its less violent, more co-operational forms.

**The Path to Modernity**

Under the impact of the Renaissance, from the late medieval period modern state structures began to evolve in western Europe (Kohn 1965: 14). The greatest changes took place in England, the Netherlands, and later on in France. In these countries, as the state began to adopt modern features of governance and administration, a common set of values that we may describe as national or proto-national began to filter through to gradually increasing sectors of the population. We do not have fully to concur with Kedourie’s claim that ‘Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century’ (Kedourie 1966: 9) to acknowledge that significant developments were occurring at every level in the societies experiencing the shift from agricultural to industrial society. By the nineteenth century, the effects of bureaucratic incorporation, coupled with the spur of industrialization, were eventually to homogenize the majority of the populations of these states into a set of civic national values based on common adherence to common political and social values. Notionally, these values could be shared irrespective of what is today termed as the ethnic provenance of that population. So the idea of civic national identity, centred upon juridical and territorial criteria (ius soli—law of the soil) of who was and was not a member of a given nation, came into existence (Ra’anan 1991: 11).

From the early years of the nineteenth century nationalist ideology, predicated upon the idea of national self-determination, spread throughout continental Europe. From Gellner’s perspective, nationalists throughout the continent saw it as their business to awaken their co-nationals from
the slumber of ignorance. By selectively utilizing existing cultural markers, nationalists sought to engender nations (Gellner 1994: 64). Their success pays testimony to Gellner’s observation that:

‘The cultures … [nationalism] claims to defend and revive are often its own inventions, or are modified out of all recognition. Nonetheless the nationalist principle as such, as distinct from each of its specific forms, and from the individually distinctive nonsense which it may preach, has very deep roots in our shared current condition…’

In western Europe, under the influence of the Enlightenment, intellectuals and ideologues took the French and, to a lesser extent, American revolutions as their role models. Indeed, Napoleon’s aspirations present us with two paradoxes that require elaboration and explanation. The first is that a self-proclaimed emperor simultaneously sought to spread republican national values in the wake of his armies’ conquests. The second paradox is that, although the doctrine of national self-determination inspired both elites and increasingly the wider population, the criteria of self-determination that came to dominate the bulk of the continent were not based upon those of civic nationalism. In order to explain this paradox we must acknowledge the tremendous cathartic effect that the French Revolution had throughout Europe. It introduced new notions of political power, and legitimized new forms of rule (Kedourie 1966: 12). Moreover, Napoleon was more interested in exploiting the lust for national self-determination than he was in propagating it.

Into what had, in effect, become a political vacuum fell another type of nationalism, that of the German Romantic movement, particularly associated with Johann Gottfried von Herder. In fact, Hechter credits Herder with having invented the term ‘nationalism’ in 1774 (Hechter 2000: 5). Although, for the Romantics, the fact that nations existed was axiomatic, they rejected the west European idea of how they were constituted. They perceived nations to be organic communities bound together by a value system that was determined by common descent, history, and innate language and culture. For Herder and his followers, the roots of nations were lost in time immemorial, and could best be articulated through the medium of language and the articulation of tradition (Kohn 1965: 30-31). Unsurprisingly, such movements were and are often linked to a literary renaissance designed to invigorate and reveal the culture of a given group to that group itself (Smith 1976: 18).

Why then was Herder’s vision of the nation so attractive in east-central Europe and the Balkans? The answer is fairly simple, and has little to do with collective or individual perceptions of putative nations in the region. East of the Rhine few, if any, identifiably modern national state structures existed. On the contrary, in ‘Germany’ a ramshackle collection of principalities, dukedoms, bishoprics and city-states prevailed. Italy was divided between a number of imperial, semi-imperial and domestic powers. The Habsburgs, Ottomans and Romanovs held sway in the rest of the continent, Iberia and most of the Nordic region to one side. As a consequence, newly emergent nationalist movements articulated their message in opposition to pre-existing state structures that were incapable of meeting the demand for the creation of a modern-nation state.
A related problem was one of deciding who actually constituted the nation, and by what criteria such selection occurred. The civic model was rejected as being inappropriate or alien to the region, and the Herderian model based around *ius sanguinis* (law of blood) emerged as dominant (Ra’anan 1991: 13). According to this model, nations represent the collective sum of a series of cultural, religious and historic memories and characteristics specific to a group of people who are most readily identifiable through the existence of a language specific to that group only. From this perspective, the nationality of an individual depends upon a series of criteria that we today label as ‘ethnic’.

According to Walker Connor (1994: 100), ‘ethnicity (the identity with one’s ethnic group) ... is derived from *Ethnos*, the Greek word for nation in the latter’s pristine sense of a group characterized by common descent.’ In contemporary scholarship, definitions of ethnicity vary greatly. As with the wider debate on the origins of nations, a basic distinction can be made between a primordial school, and a modernist school. The former holds that ‘ethnicity is so deeply rooted in historical experience that it should properly be treated as a given in human relations’. For their part, the modernists argue that ‘ethnicity is not a historical given at all, but in fact a highly adaptive and malleable phenomenon’. Alternatively, they argue that ‘ethnicity is primarily a practical resource that individuals and groups deploy opportunistically to promote their more fundamental security and economic interests and that they may even discard when alternative affiliations promise a better return.’ (Esman 1994: 10-11) While the tangible aspects of ethnicity, such as customs, traditions, language or religion, and their social and political implications emphasized by instrumentalists are important components of an individual’s or group’s ethnic identity, they do not fully explain the phenomenon in relation to the intense emotions that ‘ethnic issues’ generate.

In his exploration of the topic, Anthony D. Smith (1991: 20) offers an alternative to the aforementioned categories. He describes an ethnic group as ‘a type of cultural collectivity, one that emphasizes the role of myths of descent and historical memories, and that is recognized by one or more cultural differences like religion, customs, language, or institutions.’ As a self-defined community, ethnic groups are distinguishable by a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of common culture, the association with a specific homeland, and a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population (Smith 1991: 21). Similarly, Horowitz (1985: 41) has articulated an inclusive conception of ethnicity that ‘embraces differences identified by colour, language, religion, or some other attribute of common origin.’ This link between tangible and intangible aspects is key to understanding the political implications of ethnic identity and of the formation of conflict groups based on ethnicity. Connor has noted that tangible characteristics are only important inasmuch as they ‘contribute to this notion or sense of a group’s self-identity and uniqueness’ (Connor 1994: 104). In turn, a threat to, or opportunity for, these tangibles, real or perceived, is considered as a threat to, or opportunity for, self-identity and uniqueness. Confronting this threat or taking this opportunity leads to the ethnic group becoming a political actor by virtue of its shared ethnic
identity. As such, ethnic identity ‘can be located on a spectrum between primordial historic continuities and instrumental opportunistic adaptations’ (Esman 1994: 15).

The model of nationality based on ethnic criteria proved to be popular in Eastern Europe and the Balkans by virtue of the fact that nationalist elites were directing their ire toward alien often ‘non-indigenous’ administrations and ruling strata. Having been identified as epitomising the problem, such groups of people, would by definition be unwelcome in the new nation-states. However, further problems of selection remained. On the one hand, outside fairly small circles of educated urban-based elites, vernacular lingua francas did not exist. In the absence of mass literacy, mass communication, industrialization and transportation, convincing the rural population of their shared identity with the distant urban based bourgeoisie was bound to be problematic.

In other words nationalist elites sought to ‘nationalize’ populations that did not necessarily have any fixed national identity. A means of ‘telescoping’ the nation-building process was taking place. Themes and issues that had been worked out and resolved in France, and more particularly the Netherlands, England (and later on Britain) over a period of centuries, were being confronted and dealt within a much shorter space of time. Rapid industrialization and the more gradual arrival of mass education helped create a greater degree of linguistic homogenization, but other problems and issues remained. The most important of these revolved around ethnicity and territory and gave rise to a phenomenon that we refer to today as ethnopolitics.

Ethnopolitics as Conflict
The term conflict describes a situation in which two or more actors, who interact with each other, pursue incompatible goals, are aware of this incompatibility, and claim to be justified in the pursuit of their particular course of action. Ethnic conflicts are one particular form of such conflict in which the goals of at least one conflict party are defined in (exclusively) ethnic terms, and in which the primary fault line of confrontation is one of ethnic distinctions. Whatever the concrete issues over which conflict erupts (e.g., linguistic, religious, or cultural rights and/or corresponding claims to conditions conducive to their realization), at least one of the conflict parties will explain its dissatisfaction in ethnic terms. They will refer to their distinct identity and point to a (perceived) lack of recognition thereof. They will also claim inequality of opportunity to preserve, express, and develop it, as the reason why its members cannot realize their interests, why they do not have the same rights, or why their claims are not satisfied. Thus, ethnic conflicts are a form of group conflict in which at least one of the parties involved interprets the conflict, its causes, and potential remedies along an actually existing or perceived discriminatory ethnic divide.

Empirically, it is relatively easy to determine which conflict is an ethnic one: one knows them when one sees them. Few would dispute that Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Cyprus and the Basque country are, in one way or another, ethnic conflicts. That is so because their manifestations were/are violent and their causes and consequences obviously ethnic. On the other hand, the more recent relationships between Slovaks and Hungarians in Slovakia, Poles and Germans in Poland or Estonians and Russians in Estonia and the complex dynamics of interaction between the different
linguistic groups in Belgium and France, are also predominantly based on distinct ethnic identities and (incompatible) interest structures. Yet their manifestations are far less violent, and it is far less common to describe these situations as ethnic conflicts. Rather, terms such as tension, dispute, and controversy are used. Finally, there are situations in which various ethnic groups have different, and more or less frequently conflicting, interest structures. However the term ‘tensions’, let alone ‘conflict’, are hardly ever used to describe them, as is the case with South Tyrol, Switzerland or Catalonia, where conflicts of interest are handled within fairly stable and legitimate political institutions.

For a proper understanding of the dynamics of different ethnic conflicts it is not enough to simply look at the degree of violence present. Rather, it is necessary to distinguish between different types of ethnic groups involved in them. Within the context of this volume it makes sense to differentiate first between politically mobilized majorities and minorities. The latter can then be subdivided into four further categories:

1. external minorities, i.e., minorities that, while living on the territory of one state (host-state) are the ethnic kin of the titular nation of another, often neighbouring, state (kin-state);
2. transnational minorities, i.e., ethnic groups whose homeland stretches across several different states without them forming the titular nation in any of them;
3. indigenous minorities, i.e., ethnic groups living in their ancestral homelands in only one state of which they are not the titular nation; and
4. immigrant minorities.

Examples of the first type of ethnic minorities are the Germans in Central and Eastern Europe, South Tyrol, Belgium, Denmark and France, the Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, the Albanians in Kosovo, the Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia and the Russians in the CIS. Into the second category belong the Frisians of Germany and the Netherlands and the Basques and Catalans of Spain (and France). Ethnic minorities of the third type include the Corsicans and Bretons of France, the Galicians of Spain, the Lusatian Sorbs of Germany and the Scottish, Cornish and Welsh of Britain. Examples of the fourth group are North African immigrants in France and the Turkish ‘guest workers’ in Germany.

The Heart of the Matter: Ethnic and Territorial Claims

Politically mobilized ethnic groups, have a wide range of resources from which to draw. Decisions concerning the use of resources will lead to differences in focal points of ethnic identities (see Table 0.1), which in turn results in groups developing different political agendas in order to achieve conditions that they deem conducive to the preservation, expression, and development of these identities.

1 According to Covenant of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, an indigenous nation or people is ‘a group of human beings which possesses the will to be identified as a nation or people and to determine its common destiny as a nation or people, and is bound to a common heritage which can be historical, racial, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious or territorial.’
Consequently, ethnic minorities make demands that reflect both the historic continuities as well as perceived contemporary opportunities that underlie their collective identities. As Table 0.2 shows, these claims are generally related to one or more of four closely intertwined areas: self-determination; linguistic, religious, and cultural rights; access to resources/equality of opportunity, and/or material and political aid in support of these other three claims. Ethnic minorities make these claims vis-à-vis their host-state or their host-nation, and/or, where applicable, their kin-state or kin-nation (addressee of the ethnic claim). In the absence of a kin-state willing or able to support an external minority, kin-groups in countries other than the kin-state or other external actors (international organizations, individual states) may be sought out and lobbied to assume this patron role.

Table 0.2: Nature and addressees of ethnic claims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of the Ethnic Claim</th>
<th>Addressee of the Ethnic Claim</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-determination</td>
<td>Host-state</td>
<td>Gagauz in Moldova, Republicans and Nationalists in Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>internal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>external</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic, religious, and/or cultural rights</td>
<td>Host-state/Host-nation</td>
<td>Roma across Central and Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to resources/equality of opportunity</td>
<td>Host-state/Host-nation</td>
<td>Alsatians in France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material and/or political aid/support</td>
<td>Kin-state</td>
<td>Russians in Transdniestria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kin-nation/other kin-group</td>
<td>Ethnic Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International actors</td>
<td>Kosovo Albanians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Apart from ethnicity, the other core component of ethnopolitics is territory. The modern nation-state first emerged in Europe, and with its appearance came the institutionalized definition of state territories. For states, territory possesses certain values in and of itself. These include natural resources, such as water, iron, coal, oil, or gas. They extend to the goods and services produced by the population living in this territory and the tax revenue generated from them, and they can comprise military or strategic advantages resulting from natural boundaries, access to the open sea, and control over transport routes and waterways. Throughout European history, many wars

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2 This section draws on Wolff (2003).
3 Examples in this or any of the following tables are neither exhaustive, nor does the mentioning of a particular case in one category mean that it could not also be used as an example in another one.
have been fought over territory, territories have changed hands as a result of wars, and as a consequence new wars have arisen.

For ethnic groups territory very often is important as a crucial component of their identity. Territory is then conceptualized more appropriately as place, bearing significance in relation to the group’s history, collective memories, and ‘character’. The deep emotional attachment to territory that ethnic groups can develop and maintain often leads to intense conflict. Nevertheless, for ethnic groups, territory is, or can become, a valuable commodity as well as it provides resources and a potential power base in their bid to change an unacceptable status quo. In the case of minorities with a kin-state, a relationship is also established between host-state and kin-state, which shapes, and is in turn shaped by, the relationship each of the states has with the minority. In many cases, this state-state relationship is not so much one determined by the concepts of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nation’, but rather one that is founded on the notion of ‘territory’, precisely because of the value territory has for states.

Disputed territories are, thus, a phenomenon of inter-state relations as well as of inter-ethnic relations, and similar to ethnic claims, it is possible to distinguish between the nature and the level of the territorial claim (see Table 0.3).

In their attempts to preserve, express, and develop their distinct identities, ethnic groups perceive threats and opportunities. The more deeply felt these perceptions are, the more they will be linked to the very survival of the group and the more intense will the conflict be that they can potentially generate. This links the issue of ethnicity to the notion of political power. The connection between ethnicity and power has important political consequences in that any ethnic group that is conscious of its uniqueness, and wishes to preserve it, is involved in a struggle for political power. It either seeks to retain a measure of political power it possesses, or it strives to acquire the amount of power that it deems necessary in order to preserve its identity as a distinct ethnic group, that is, to defeat the threats and seize the opportunities it faces. This desire to gain political power for an ethnic group is expressed in the concept of (ethno-) nationalism; according to Smith (1991: 20) ‘an ideological movement aiming to attain or maintain autonomy, unity and identity for a social group which is deemed to constitute a nation.’

Often, incompatible nationalist doctrines are at the centre of the relationship between minority and host-state. It is within this context that opportunity and threat have various, yet concretely identifiable meanings. They may be either positively or negatively related to the preservation, expression and development of a group’s ethnic identity and to the ability of the host-state to
preserve the integrity of the territorial or civic nation. For a minority, opportunities will manifest themselves, for example, through different regimes of self-administration or self-government. Such rights may be realized in local, regional, or federal frameworks within the host-state. Alternatively, opportunities may also arise in the separation from the host-state leading either to independent statehood or, where applicable, to unification with the kin-state. Threats generally occur when state institutions deny an ethnic group access to the resources that are essential for the preservation, expression, and development of a group’s identity – access to linguistic, educational, or religious facilities as well as to positions of power in the institutions of the state. Threats can also become manifest in policies of unwanted assimilation, in discrimination, and deprivation. At their most extreme, they take the form of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and genocide.

It is in these most extreme cases that the relationship between minority and host-state coincides with that between minority and host-nation, that is, the titular or dominant ethnic group has monopolized all institutions of the state. Although recent European history has provided a number of examples of this kind, this is, nevertheless, not the rule. Yet, even in its less extreme forms, the relationship between minority and host-nation is often characterized by inter-ethnic tension, resulting from the politicization and radicalization of different ethnic identities and claims for the establishment of conditions conducive to their preservation, expression, and development. Responses to such claims are then perceived as threats and/or opportunities.

This why we hold that ethnic conflict is best described as a form of conflict in which at least one of the parties involved interprets the conflict, its causes, and potential settlements along an existing or perceived discriminating ethnic divide and pursues policies related to one or more of the ethnic and territorial claims outlined above. Participants in such conflicts may seek either to counter or to realize such claims. Thus, ethnic conflict can either occur as group-state conflict, i.e., conflict between an ethnic minority and the institutions of its host-state, or as inter-ethnic conflict, i.e., between an ethnic minority and its host-nation (or parts thereof). The two may, but need not, occur in parallel or coincide. In addition, as ethnic conflicts are rooted in the perception of threats and the policies formulated to counter them, ethnic conflicts may also give rise to other forms of conflict within a country. For example, conflict might arise as a result of an actual or perceived ‘over-accommodation’ of the interests of an ethnic minority, which (sections of) the host-nation may regard as being detrimental to their own interests. This is very often, but not necessarily, the case where accommodation of minority interests is pursued territorially, and the territory also contains a significant portion of members of the host-nation. The simultaneous occurrence of inter-ethnic and group-state conflict is another potential reason for conflict between host-state and host-nation. As inter-ethnic conflict threatens the social integrity of the host-state, actions of the host-nation may be perceived as one source of this threat and be countered by the host-state. This, in turn, can be perceived by the host-nation, or at least by some sections within it, as denying an opportunity to defend, or establish, conditions conducive to the preservation,
expression, and development of its own ethnic identity. Table 0.4 gives an overview of the different types of threat (perceptions) that can become sources of ethnic conflicts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threats Perceived by</th>
<th>Host-State</th>
<th>Host-Nation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>Territorial integrity, Societal integrity</td>
<td>Competition for resources deemed essential for the preservation, expression, and development of ethnic identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host-State</td>
<td>Unwanted assimilation, Discrimination, Deprivation, Ethnic cleansing, Genocide</td>
<td>‘Over-accommodation’ of minority interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host-Nation</td>
<td>Competition for resources deemed essential for the preservation, expression, and development of ethnic identity</td>
<td>Societal integrity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A somewhat different pattern of relationships emerges in cases where a minority has a kin-state. Here, the relationship between the two is based on common ethnicity and a territorially divided ethnic nation, and is, therefore, normally not one of ethnic conflict, but rather one of patronage. Patronage results from one of two aspects, and often from a combination of both – national sentiment and national interest. Popular sentiment concerning the fate of members of the nation living in another state and the desire to unite the national territory and bring together in it all the members of the ethnic nation finds its expression in irredentist or pan-nationalism (Smith 1991: 83). Yet, as national sentiment is not always expressed in irredentist nationalism, so is the relationship between minority and kin-state not always about secession and subsequent unification with the kin-state. Informed by domestic and foreign national interests, territorial unification may not be considered desirable for either kin-state or minority, or it may not be possible given geopolitical or regional interest and opportunity structures. Alternatively then, the relationship between minority and kin-state can be one of ‘repatriation’ as with the Federal Republic of Germany and German minorities in Central and Eastern Europe in the post-1950, and especially the post-1989 period. Or it can be one of facilitating the establishment of conditions in the host-

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4 A good western European example for this is the marching season in Northern Ireland: Some of the most contentious parades have been banned or re-routed over the past several years to avoid violent clashes between the two communities; yet, this often resulted in violent protests by Loyalists not only against the Nationalist/Republican community, but also against the British authorities.

5 Threats perceived by minorities comprise all of the features in both boxes. Depending on the specificity of the situation it is not always possible for the minority (or the outside observer) to determine the source of the treat with absolute accuracy. In particular, in situations where the host-nation has complete control over the institutions of the state and uses them against the minority, distinctions between host-state and host-nation are blurred, and to some extent even irrelevant.

6 Horowitz (1985: 229-288) has emphasised the variety of factors that make successful, or even desirable, irredentas very unlikely.
state conducive to the preservation, expression, and development of the ethnic identity of the kin-groups in this state. With varying degrees of success, the numerous bilateral treaties concluded between Germany and the states of central and eastern Europe after 1989 testify to this.\(^7\)

A conflictual relationship between minority and kin-state is then likely to develop when their respective political agendas are mutually incompatible. This can be the case if the irredentist nationalism of the kin-state is not reciprocated by the minority, or of sections within it, for which the cases of the Sudetenland and of Alsace during (parts of) the inter-war period are good examples. Conflict is also possible between the minority and its kin-nation as the cases of the German minority in Poland and the responses by representatives of the minority group to political demands from within the expellee organizations in Germany indicate.\(^8\) Vice versa, a conflictual relationship develops if the ‘secessionism’ of the kin-group is not welcomed by the kin-state, or when some of its manifestations are perceived as a threat to the kin-state’s security and relationship with the host-state. There two classic examples of this phenomenon. The first is South Tyrol whose secessionism throughout most of the inter-war period was ‘inconvenient’ for both Austria and Nazi Germany. The second is of Northern Ireland, where, despite a formal constitutional commitment to ‘irredentism’ that existed in the form of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution until the end of 1999, violent Republicanism has always also been perceived as a threat to the Republic of Ireland. Yet, these two cases also show that, given a responsive host-state, a non-irredentist kin-state can have a moderating effect on the policies pursued by its ethnic kin-group abroad.

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\(^7\) Concerning Germany and her minorities, see Wolff (2000: 183-203).

\(^8\) Political representatives of ethnic German expellees from Poland have frequently demanded the restitution of property and the right to return to their former homelands. This demand has been rejected by the German minority in the two countries (as well as the Polish and German governments) as counter-productive to reconciliation and the demands of the minorities for cultural and linguistic rights.
Table 0.5: Conflict issues and examples of their manifestation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minority</th>
<th>Host-nation</th>
<th>Host-state</th>
<th>Kin-state/Kin-nation</th>
<th>Other external actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Minority | • Political goals and means to realize them  
                  • Intra-community disputes among Kosovo Albanians and Basques | • Territorial control, equal access to resources  
                  • Catalans  
                  • South Tyrolese Germans | • Territorial control (autonomy/secession)  
                  • South Tyrol  
                  • Corsica  
                  • Minority rights and their implementation  
                  • Roma in Central and Eastern Europe  
                  • Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia  
                  • Equality of opportunity  
                  • Russians in Baltic states | • Political goals and means to realize them  
                  • Greeks and Turks in Cyprus | • Political goals and means to realize them  
                  • Kosovo Albanians |
| Host-nation | • Political goals and means to realize them  
                  • Serb Resistance Movement after 1997/98 vs. supporters of President Milošević over Kosovo policy | • Access to, and control over, resources  
                  • Italians in South Tyrol | • Interference, perceived disadvantages because of support of external minority  
                  • Italians in South Tyrol | • Interference by external actors  
                  • Reaction in Serbia to the NATO air campaign |
| Host-state | • Political goals and means to realize them  
                  • Territorial control  
                  • Cyprus  
                  • Human and minority rights policy  
                  • South Tyrol | | | • Sovereignty  
                  • Kosovo |
| Kin-state/Kin-nation | • Political goals and means to realize them  
                  • Different political parties in Greece and Turkey | | • Interference by the kin-state in an ethnic conflict in the host-state  
                  • Cyprus | |
| Other external actors | | | • Conflicting interest structures  
                  • Kosovo | |
Ethnopolitics as Co-operation

However, it would be a mistake to assume that ethnopolitics is only a matter of confrontation between different politically mobilized groups. On the contrary, there are a range of examples where ethnopolitics is pursued in a spirit of compromise and co-operation (see Table 0.6).

The reasons for co-operation can be various. At the most basic level different ethnic groups often realize that co-operation is more profitable than conflict. For obvious reasons, this tends to limit co-operation to cases where political agendas are not mutually incompatible. Alternatively, co-operation may take place where differences can be rendered compatible or where the groups at least agree to put to one side incompatible aims and not to seek to realize them at all costs. Instead, they may come to focus on those elements of their political agendas that can be pursued jointly and with mutual benefit. One can point to a growing number of examples where such levels of co-operation have been achieved in the past decades: the Åland islands, Belgium, Catalonia, Gagauzia, the German-Danish border region, Northern Ireland, South Tyrol, Switzerland and Opole Silesia to name but a few. In none of these cases has ethnic identity lost its salience. On the contrary, it continues to play an important part in day-to-day politics and has often even been politically institutionalized through different systems of proportional allocation of funds, jobs and seats in parliaments and/or through qualified voting procedures in legislative and executive organs. While this underlines that ethnicity-based politics is not in itself a source of conflict and violence, it leaves open the question why its 'civilized' conduct is possible in some cases but not others. Without going into too much detail here and repeating what has been argued elsewhere the following factors have, albeit varying, influence on the possibility of a co-operational conduct of ethnopolitics, or the transformation thereto:

Conflict weariness of the population at large. This often becomes an important factor after (prolonged) periods of violent conflict that have reached a stalemate where it is clear to most people that violent strategies only increase the pain and suffering of all, including their own group. In such situations, there is a window of opportunity for political leaders with an agenda orientated at compromise and subsequent co-operation. This has been the case, for example, in Northern Ireland (leading to the Good Friday Agreement of 1998) and South Tyrol (leading to the package solution of 1969).

(Self-) interest of political elites. If conflict weariness of the population is to lead anywhere, it requires a political elite able and willing to capitalize on the opportunity that it offers. However, to sustain co-operational politics and make it the norm of political conduct in ethnically plural societies requires more. It needs political elites that regard co-operation as rewarding in itself and therefore have an interest in maintaining such a state of affairs rather than returning to conflictual politics. Good examples for this are Belgium, Catalonia and South Tyrol.

Pressures and incentives. What is often necessary for new elites to emerge or old elites to change their behaviour are pressures and incentives from the outside. In the case of conflicts engulfing an entire country, external actors are the most likely source of such pressures and incentives. They
may take various forms. Institutional designs may be proposed and/or imposed that reward co-operation and/or punish confrontation (e.g., the autonomy and/or power-sharing systems in Belgium, Catalonia, Gagauzia, Northern Ireland and South Tyrol). Economic development, inward and foreign direct investment can be made conditional upon co-operation between different ethnic groups on the ground (e.g., American and EU involvement in Northern Ireland). Mediation and arbitration can be offered (e.g., the activities of the High Commissioner on National Minorities of the OSCE in Central and Eastern Europe). Supra-regional integration may be stimulated (e.g., the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership). Last but not least, there is also what could be called the ‘flattery factor’, when powerful leaders personally engage with local elites and populations in conflict zones (e.g., President Clinton’s engagement with Northern Ireland).

**Traditions and precedents of compromise and co-operation.** Clearly, what is also helpful is when there are periods in the history of a particular area and/or its population that can be referred to when seeking precedents of successful co-operation between different ethnic groups. Such periods of co-operation are of particular relevance with regard to Germany’s historical engagement in Eastern Europe. A ‘golden age of harmony and prosperity’ can act as an additional factor in the transformation from conflict to co-operation in that it can be used as evidence for the possibility and success of a different kind of ethnopolitics.

None of these factors in themselves are necessarily sufficient to affect a transition from confrontation to co-operation or to sustain co-operation in the long run. What they do show, however, is that there are ways in which such a transition can be helped or how co-operation can be sustained once it has been established as an acceptable and beneficial way of conducting politics in ethnically plural societies. This fact once again underlines an earlier point: ethnopolitics is not just about (violent) conflict, but can also take the form of a legitimate democratic political process. To provide evidence for this, and change the perception of ethnicity-based politics as something inherently bad, i.e., to give a more balanced account of contemporary European ethnopolitics is another aim of this encyclopaedia.
Table 0.6: Areas of co-operation and examples of their manifestation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External minority</th>
<th>Host-nation</th>
<th>Host-state</th>
<th>Kin-state</th>
<th>Other external actors</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Political goals and means to realize them</td>
<td>• Shared regional interests</td>
<td>• Cultural and education policy</td>
<td>• Direct aid programmes to improve living conditions</td>
<td>• Intervention with the host-state</td>
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<tr>
<td>q Joint electoral platform of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia (later on Party of the Hungarian Coalition)</td>
<td>q Poles and Germans in Upper Silesia</td>
<td>q Cultural autonomy of ethnic minorities in Hungary</td>
<td>q Germany and German minorities across Central and Eastern Europe</td>
<td>q US and EU mediation efforts and intervention in Kosovo</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Direct aid programmes to improve living conditions</td>
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<td>• Intervention with the host-state</td>
<td>q UN/EU reconstruction efforts in Kosovo</td>
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<td>• Hungary – Serbia/FRY over the drafting of ethnic Hungarians for police duty in Kosovo in 1997/8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Host-nation</td>
<td>• Political goals and means to realize them</td>
<td>• Political goals and means to realize them</td>
<td>• Aid programmes to benefit entire regions</td>
<td>• Aid programmes to benefit entire regions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>q Widespread resistance in Czech Republic against compensation for/public apology to expelled Germans</td>
<td>q Support of ‘tough’ measures against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo by Serb public, especially in the late 1980s, early 1990s</td>
<td>q Germany and German minorities across Central and Eastern Europe</td>
<td>q Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Host-state</td>
<td>• Political goals and means to realize them</td>
<td>• Political goals and means to realize them</td>
<td>• Recognition of borders and rights of minorities</td>
<td>• Aid programmes aimed at the transformation of the legal system</td>
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<td>q Widespread cross-party and cross-institutional consensus on minority policy in Hungary and Poland</td>
<td>q Widespread cross-party and cross-institutional consensus on minority policy in Hungary and Poland</td>
<td>q Bilateral treaties between Hungary and Romania, and between Germany and Poland</td>
<td>q Contribution of the HCNM to the drafting of adequate legislation for the protection of ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kin-state</td>
<td>• Political goals and means to realize them</td>
<td>• Political goals and means to realize them</td>
<td>• Political goals and means to realize them</td>
<td>• Pressure and incentives to seek and/or maintain friendly relations with host-state</td>
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<td>q Widespread cross-party and cross-institutional consensus in Germany on support for ethnic Germans in Central and Eastern Europe</td>
<td>q Widespread cross-party and cross-institutional consensus in Germany on support for ethnic Germans in Central and Eastern Europe</td>
<td>q Widespread cross-party and cross-institutional consensus in Germany on support for ethnic Germans in Central and Eastern Europe</td>
<td>q EU and NATO admission criteria for new members</td>
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<td>Other external actors</td>
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<td>• Planning and implementing joint strategies for regional stability</td>
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<td>q EU policy in the Balkans</td>
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The Project Revealed

Where then, in this first decade of the twenty-first century do these events, themes and ideas leave us? We continue to live in a state system that is predicated upon the idea that nations are natural phenomena and that they have an inalienable right to self-determination. What is far less clear, in theory and practice, is how this right to self-determination can be realized without bloodshed and the creation of new injustices. While innovative forms of 'internal self-determination' have been implemented in places as diverse Belgium, Catalonia, Hungary and South Tyrol, elsewhere the idea of 'external self-determination', i.e., that nations should achieve self-determination through the creation of independent states, continues to cause violent conflict. Supranational pressures exist, but the apostles of European unity have still not managed to supplant the seductive power of the nation-state. In fact, if anything the debate on the future of the nation-state shows no signs of dissipating in any part of the continent. In a sense, the debate upon the origins of nations is sterile. The doctrine has proven to be so successful that national identity is taken as being a common sense notion. We have to deal with what that reality as opposed to what ought to be, or might have been.

In light of the above, this work seeks first and foremost to highlight the significance of ethnopolitics in Europe. Neither the editors nor the individual contributors seek to make value judgements concerning the merits of individual cases. Rather, it is our intention to provide a unique reference source covering the entire continent that provides the reader with information and analysis. In some cases, we provide detailed country guides as well as entries on specific ethno-national communities. In other cases, we provide more general information within the case studies. This differentiated approach has been chosen according to a set of scholarly criteria. These include: the variety and nature of individual case studies, the relative political weight of a given country in the European political space, and in some instances to take account of the way in which case studies have been constructed.

In a general sense, the countries and cases selected have been chosen on the basis of their importance to contemporary European politics. It is important that the reader notes that the volume is not concerned solely with the politics of ethnic minorities, any more than it is a catalogue of the various ethnic groups that are claimed to exist in Europe. It is not a checklist of 'lesser-known European peoples'. The work is concerned with the politicization of ethnicity and how it manifests itself in political and social programmes that have a discernible impact at a level other than the purely local. For reasons of space and on the grounds of practicality, we have limited ourselves to considering groups conventionally considered as indigenous to Europe. There may well be a need for a companion volume that deals with more recently arrived groups, but any attempt to do so in this text would have rendered the project too unwieldy. Of course, some groups such as the Turkish population in Germany, the Algerian community in France, and the Pakistani community in the United Kingdom, far outweigh, in both the political and numeric senses, many of the groups considered in this volume. However, both types cannot adequately be covered within a single volume, except perhaps at the most superficial of levels. As for the groups we do consider, whether or not they form majorities, minorities, or are external, or transnational
in nature is irrelevant. What determines their inclusion in this encyclopaedia is their degree of cultural, historical or political salience and significance.

References