In a Trumpian world, Europe needs to assume greater responsibility for its own defence
Three weeks before the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, EU leaders came together for their first-ever meeting solely dedicated to defence issues. At that February 3, 2025 gathering in Brussels, it was clear that Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was only the tip of an iceberg of security challenges that Europe faces. Not only has war on a scale not seen in Europe since 1945 returned to the continent, but Russian sabotage of everything from critical infrastructure to elections is at levels reminiscent of the cold war and the future of the EU’s most important defence alliance, Nato, is uncertain.
In light of these challenges, let alone the ongoing instability in the Middle East, Western Balkans, and South Caucasus, it’s hard to disagree with the observation by EU council president António Costa that “Europe needs to assume greater responsibility for its own defence”.
And yet, at the end of the day, the outcome of what was ultimately only an informal meeting was underwhelmingly summarised by Costa as “progress in our discussions on building the Europe of Defence”.
This does not bode well for Ukraine. US support is unlikely to continue at the levels reached during the final months of the Biden administration. In fact, ongoing debates in the White House on Ukraine policy have already caused some disruption to arms shipments from Washington to Kyiv.
If there is a silver lining for Ukraine here, it is Trump’s continuous search for a good deal – his latest idea being that Ukraine would pay for US support with favourable concessions on rare earths, and potentially other strategic resources, such as titanium, iron ore and coal, as well as critical minerals, including lithium. Whether this is a sustainable basis for US support in the long term is as unclear as whether it will make any material difference to Trump thinking beyond a ceasefire and to an actual peace settlement.
The other ray of hope for Ukraine is that there is a much greater recognition in EU capitals now about the need for a common European approach to defence. A greater focus on building a ‘coalition of the willing’ including non-EU members UK and Norway is a potentially promising path.
But hope, as they say, is not a winning strategy. In a Trump-like transactional fashion, Brussels, in exchange for a deal on defence with London, insists on UK concessions on youth mobility and fishing rights. It’s unlikely that this will prove an insurmountable stumbling bloc, but it will create yet more delays at a moment when time is of the essence for Europe as a whole to signal determination about security and defence.
This is further complicated by two factors. On the one hand, there is the looming threat of a trade war between the US and the EU. That the UK may be able to avoid a similar fate, according to Trump, may be good news for London, but will also put the UK in a potentially awkward position as it seeks an ambitious post-Brexit reset with the EU and hopes to improve relations with China. With Trump clearly hostile towards both Brussels and Beijing, this may become an impossible balancing act for the British government to pull off.
On the other hand, EU unity has become more fragile. Trump’s victory has emboldened other populist leaders in Europe, notably the significantly more pro-Russian Slovak and Hungarian prime ministers, Robert Fico and Viktor Orbán. The same applies to the UK, where the opposition Reform UK party has overtaken the ruling Labour party in the latest public opinion polls. Nigel Farage, the party’s pro-Trump leader, is known for his Ukraine-sceptical views.
Add to that a weak government in France and likely protracted coalition negotiations in Germany after parliamentary elections there at the end of February, and the prospects for decisive EU and wider European action on strengthening security and defence capabilities become vanishingly slim.
Seen in the light of such multiple and complex challenges, it is astonishing how much the EU is still trapped in a wishful thinking exercise – and one that appears more and more disconnected from reality. Contrary to Costa’s fulsome pronouncements after the EU leaders’ meeting, there is little evidence that the US under Trump will remain Europe’s friend, ally and partner.
Nor is there much evidence that the American president shares the values and principles that once underpinned the now rapidly dismantling international order. Other countries’ national sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of their borders are not at the forefront of Trump’s foreign policy doctrine.
If, as Costa proclaimed, “peace in Europe depends on Ukraine winning a comprehensive, just and lasting peace”, then the future looks bleak indeed for Europe and Ukraine.
The EU and its member states are a long way off from being able to provide Ukraine with the support it needs to win. This is not just because they lack military and defence-industrial capabilities. They also lack a credible, shared vision of how to acquire them while navigating a Trumpian world.
An earlier version of this analysis was published by The Conversation on February 5, 2025.
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